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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of summation
evaluation of secrets. The secrets are distributed over a network
of nodes that form a ring graph. Privacy–preserving iterative
protocols for computing the sum of the secrets are proposed,
which are compatible with node join and leave situations.
Theoretic bounds are derived regarding the utility and accuracy,
and the proposed protocols are shown to comply with differential
privacy requirements. Based on utility, accuracy and privacy,
we also provide guidance on appropriate selections of random
noise parameters. Additionally, a few numerical examples that
demonstrate their effectiveness are provided.
Index Terms—Privacy–Preserving, Summation, Differential
Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Data mining is a practical technique to extract useful
patterns from datasets. Generally, conventional data mining
algorithms are developed from a centralized perspective, and
effective and robust over an aggregated dataset with an implicit
assumption that the collection of such a dataset is unimpeded.
However, as the information technology rapidly develops,
machines that manage to collect and store data, undertake
computing and communication tasks are ubiquitous, from
powerful servers, to personal agents, such as PCs and smart
phones. On the one hand, data collection is usually carried
out in a distributed fashion, the data aggregation pushes the
communication and computation cost of the central server
to a bottleneck on the implementation of centralized data
mining methods. On the other hand, the collected data might
be sensitive and confidential to the distributed agents, and
therefore unanonymized plain data are prohibited to give away
directly. Confronted with these challenges in terms of dis-
tributed computation and privacy preservation, improvements
have to be made on existing data mining methods. The relevant
field have drawn much attention [1].
The evaluation of sum of a collection of secrets is a
fundamental problem that arises in the distributed privacy–
preserving data mining. In the field of secure multi–party
computation, classical summation protocols are presented [2],
which serve as efficient subroutines for distributed compu-
tation. However, the participating parties must follow strict
interaction rules in finite steps, leading to inflexibility when
facing the disturbance caused by node join and leave. In
cryptography, homomorphic encryption and secret sharing
can be used as secure summation tools. Nevertheless, the
encryption of plaintext yields much more complex results in
general, resulting in high communication and computational
complexity. Distributed averaging consensus may also be a
good approach to evaluating network summation, but the
secrets can be perfectly inferred under some observability
conditions and the performance against variation of party
number is left unexplored [3].
In this paper, we propose privacy–preserving summation
protocols that are robust against dynamic disturbance and
involves no cryptographic encryption. The contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
(i) Innovative iteration–based distributed privacy–preserving
protocols for evaluating summation of secrets are pro-
posed.
(ii) Theoretic analysis on utility, accuracy and privacy is
provided, illustrated by a few numerical examples.
(iii) The tradeoff problem between utility, accuracy and pri-
vacy is solved for providing guidance on the choice of
random noise.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem
formulation is introduced in Section II. We propose our
protocols in Section III. Theoretic analysis of utility, accuracy
and privacy is provided in Section IV. In Section V, several
examples are give to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed protocols. A few concluding remarks are given in
Section VI.
Notations. We let R,R+ denote the set of real and positive
real numbers, respectively. Similarly, we introduce Z,Z≥0 as
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the set of integers and nonnegative integers, respectively. Let
E(X) denote the expected value of a random variable or
vector X . We use fX(x) to denote the probability density
function (PDF) of a random variable or vector X . Let var(·)
denote the variance of a random variable and cov(·) denote
the covariance of a random vector. We let Pr(·) denote the
probability of an event. We use ‖ · ‖F, ‖ · ‖p to represent the
Frobenius norm, p–norm of a vector, respectively, and ‖ · ‖ to
denote the 2–norm by default. Let In denote the identity matrix
of size n, and 1n denote the all–ones vector of size n. Let
M> represent the conjugate transpose of a matrix or a vector
M. Let diag(a1, . . . , an) denote the diagonal matrix with its
diagonal entries being a1, . . . , an from top left to bottom right.
In addition, the set of diagonal entries of a real matrix M is
denoted as diag(M). We use tr(·) to be the trace of a matrix.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Network
Let a group of nodes be indexed as in V = {1, . . . , n} with
n > 2. Each node i ∈ V can send information to only one
of the other nodes j ∈ V, with the connection represented by
an ordered pair (i, j). We suppose, without loss of generality,
that node i talks to node i+ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and node
n talks to node 1, based on which we introduce a permutation
pi : V→ V with
pi(i) =
{
i+ 1 if i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
1 otherwise.
Then the network can be modelled by a directed ring graph
G = (V,E) illustrated in Figure 1, where the edge set E =
{(i, pi(i)) : i ∈ V}.
Fig. 1: An 8–node directed ring graph.
B. General Privacy–Preserving Summation Protocols
Consider a distributed summation occasion in which each
node i ∈ V holds a secret si ∈ R. The collective goal
for all nodes is to compute
∑
i∈V
si by undertaking certain
communication strategies over the network G, in the meantime
each node does not disclose its own secret to others. Formally,
we write the principles for Privacy–Preserving Summation
Protocols (PPSPs) as follows.
(i) [Communication Principle]: Each node i ∈ V is only
permitted to interact with pi(i).
(ii) [Privacy Principle] Each node i ∈ V does not disclose
si to others.
(iii) [Utility Principle] Each node obtains
∑
i∈V
si as output.
III. ACHIEVEMENTS WITH ITERATIVE METHOD
In this section, we introduce realizations of PPSPs. We
discretize the time as k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Let each node i ∈ V
hold a dynamic state xi(k), initialized as xi(0) = si. Introduce
vi : Z≥0 → R for all i ∈ V satisfying lim
k→∞
vi(k) = 0. Let
{βi(k)}i∈V,k∈Z≥0 be independent random variables. Let pi−1
denote the inverse of the permutation pi. Then our deterministic
iterative PPSP can be described as follows.
SI-PPSP Synchronous Iterative PPSP
1: Set k ← 0 and initialize xi(0) = si for all i ∈ V.
2: Each node i generates βi(k) ∈ R according to a distribu-
tion with zero mean and variance v2i (k).
3: Each node i sends di(k) = xi(k)− βi(k) to node pi(i).
4: Each node i updates its state by
xi(k + 1) = βi(k) + dpi−1(i)(k).
5: Set k ← k + 1 and go to step 1.
We term the described protocol as a Synchronous Iterative
PPSP (SI-PPSP). The “synchronous” in SI–PPSP is in the
sense that a global network clock is necessary, in order to
schedule all nodes’ communication and computation behaviors
at each discrete time k. It is clear that the communication
principle in Section II-B is met under SI-PPSP. We next show
that the privacy and utility principles are also satisfied for
the proposed protocol. On the one hand, at each time k, the
only content that node i sends out is di(k) to node pi(i),
which contains not only its current state xi(k), but a random
number βi(k) generated by itself, which prevents node pi(i)
from perfectly learning about its true state. On the other hand,
it can be shown by direct computation:∑
i∈V
xi(k + 1) =
∑
i∈V
(βi(k) + dpi−1(i)(k))
=
∑
i∈V
βi(k) +
∑
i∈V
(xpi−1(i)(k)− βpi−1(i)(k))
=
∑
i∈V
xi(k).
This implies that the network sum
∑
i∈V
xi(k) remains un-
changed across the iteration process.
Evidently, a global clock is required within SI-PPSP, which
involves a centralized perspective and slightly breaches the
distributed setup. Based on [4], one can also provide an asyn-
chronized version of SI-PPSP (called AI-PPSP) to facilitate
distributed implementations, where each node is equipped with
a local Poisson clock and the network demands no central
scheduling.
Remark. Relevant work is presented in [5], [6], where the
information exchange rule that preserve network summation is
used to shuffle node states, which turns out to be an universal
privacy–preserving subroutine for distribution algorithms. In
contrast, this paper proposes a sum evaluation protocol by
introducing zero–mean random variables with diminishing
variance.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Utility Analysis
For SI-PPSP, we provide the following result.
Theorem 1. Consider sequences
{yi(k)}∞k=0 =
{ n−1∑
r=0
xi(k + r)
}∞
k=0
for all i ∈ V. Then along SI-PPSP, the following statements
hold for each i ∈ V.
(i) If vi(k) = cik+di with ci, di > 0, then
lim
k→∞
E
∑
i∈V
∣∣∣∣∣∣yi(k)−
∑
j∈V
sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ cMpin
√
n
6
,
where cM = max{ci : i ∈ V}.
(ii) If vi(k) = ciφki with ci > 0 and 0 < φi < 1, then
lim
k→∞
E
∑
i∈V
∣∣∣∣∣∣yi(k)−
∑
j∈V
sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi∈V cin
√
n
1− φ2i
.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A. Evi-
dently, yi(k) can be termed as a solution estimator. Theorem
1 clarifies that each node can add up n consecutive states
of its own as an approximation of the network sum, after SI-
PPSP executes for a sufficiently long time. Theorem 1 provides
asymptotic upper bounds for the execution error of SI-PPSP
in mean square expectation along time under two commonly
used classes of random variance options. This clearly shed
theoretic light on the utility of the proposed protocol.
B. Accuracy Analysis
In the following, we provide a lemma that assists with the
proof of further results.
Lemma 1. Consider matrices C1, . . . ,Cm ∈ Rn×n and
random vectors r1, . . . , rm ∈ Rn. Suppose all the compo-
nents of ri, i = 1, . . . ,m are pairwise independent. Define
σiM = max(diag(cov(r
i))). Then
tr(cov(
m∑
i=1
Ciri)) ≤
m∑
i=1
‖Ci‖2FσiM.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix B.
The following theorem studies the variance of the solution
estimator.
Theorem 2. Consider the same sequences {yi(k)}∞k=0, i ∈
V as in Theorem 1. Then along SI-PPSP, there holds
lim
k→∞
E(yi(k)) =
∑
j∈V
sj for all i ∈ V. Furthermore, for each
i ∈ V, the following conclusions can be drawn.
(i) If vi(k) = cik+di with ci, di > 0, then
lim
k→∞
∑
i∈V
var(yi(k)) ≤ c
2
Mpi
2n2
3
,
where cM = max{ci : i ∈ V}.
(ii) If vi(k) = ciφki with ci > 0 and 0 < φi < 1, then
lim
k→∞
∑
i∈V
var(yi(k)) ≤ max
i∈V
2n2c2i
1− φ2i
.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 clarifies the convergence results for the variance of
the solution estimator, providing measurement for the accuracy
of SI-PPSP.
C. Privacy Analysis
Adversaries against a general privacy–preserving protocol
can be simply classified as global and local ones. Global ad-
versaries are usually powerful eavesdroppers, who have access
to all communication contents shared among nodes and aim
to recover all nodes’ secrets based on these observations. In
contrast, local adversaries are a subset of protocol participants,
who obey the protocol rules but in the meantime try to infer the
other nodes’ secrets. Privacy analysis against local adversaries
are usually termed as semi-honest security in the field of
secure multiparty computation. In this section, we will focus
on powerful global eavesdroppers for SI-PPSP, the privacy
analysis against which will cover semi-honest assumptions.
In practical implementation, SI-PPSP is executed for finite
time period 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1, which is called K–step SI-PPSP.
Evidently, under SI-PPSP a global adversary aims to infer
{si}i∈V based on the observation {di(k)}i∈V,k=0,1,...,K−1.
Such a privacy reconstruction relation can be represented by a
mapping MK : Rn → RnK , which maps the private data
{si}i∈V to the observation {di(k)}i∈V,k=0,1,...,K−1. In the
following, we formally introduce a few notions that assist with
differential privacy analysis [7].
Definition 1. Consider two network secrets s = [s1 . . . sn]>
and s′ = [s′1 . . . s
′
n]
> in vector form. Then s and s′ are said
to be δ–adjacent if there exists a unique 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
sj = s
′
j for all j 6= i and
|si − s′i| ≤ δ.
Definition 2. SI-PPSP preserves (, δ,K)–differential privacy
if
Pr(MK(s) ⊂ R) ≤ e Pr(MK(s′) ⊂ R)
for all R ∈ RnK and any two δ–adjacent secrets s, s′ ∈ Rn.
For SI-PPSP, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3. Suppose {βi(k)}i∈V,k=0,1,...,K−1 are Laplace
distributed random variables.
(i) If vi(k) = cik+di with ci, di > 0, then SI-PPSP preserves(
c−1m δK
(
K − 1
2
+ dM
)
, δ,K
)
–differential privacy, where cm = min{ci : i ∈ V} and
dM = max{di : i ∈ V}.
(ii) If vi(k) = ciφki with ci > 0 and 0 < φi < 1, then
SI-PPSP preserves(
c−1m δ(1− φKm)
φK−1m − φKm
, δ,K
)
–differential privacy, where cm = min{ci : i ∈ V} and
φm = min{φi : i ∈ V}.
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix D.
Clearly, Theorem 3 guarantees that SI-PPSP can preserve
differential privacy by only choosing the random noise βi(k)
to be Laplace distributed, implying that it complys with state-
of-the-art privacy metrics.
D. Utility, Accuracy and Privacy Tradeoff
The following definition is provided for specifying a class
of adversaries.
Definition 3. Adversaries who aim to distinguish δ–adjacent
secrets s, s′ ∈ Rn based on the observation MK(s) and
MK(s′) are termed as δ–differential attackers.
We now provide the following theorem to characterize
the tradeoff among utility, accuracy and privacy–preserving
capability of SI-PPSP.
Theorem 4. Consider K–step SI-PPSP against δ–differential
attackers. Let γu, γa, γp > 0 be fixed importance balancers
for utility, accuracy and privacy. Let Mu,Ma,Mp denote
the corresponding metrics concluded in Theorem 1, 2 and 3.
Consider the tradeoff problem
min
ci>0,di≥0
γuMu + γaMa + γpMp.
Suppose vi(k) = cik+di with ci > 0 and di ≥ 0. Then
necessarily and sufficiently the optimal d1 = · · · = dn = 0,
and the optimal choices of ci are c¯ = c1 = · · · = cn being
the real root of the following cubic equation
4γapi
2n2c¯3 +
√
6γupin
3
2 c¯2 − 3γpδK(K − 1) = 0,
which always uniquely exists.
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Appendix E. For
the 1k–decaying variance case, Theorem 4 provides guidance
on appropriate selection of the decay parameters by taking into
account the utility, accuracy and privacy–preserving capability.
However, it is fairly difficult to provide theoretic analysis on
the tradeoff problem for the exponentially decaying variance
case, because it leads to a complex program and the solution
is nontrivial.
E. Node Join and Leave
Common occasions may occur in which during the execu-
tion of PPSP a node chooses to drop out, or an external party
would like to join the network sum evaluation. Such node is
called a dynamic node. Note that privacy disclosure of the
dynamic node’s state to all nodes except for the neighbor of
the dynamic node is trivial if they know its identity. Therefore,
we assume that the dynamic node’s identity is anonymous. It
turns our that our SI-PPSP and AI-PPSP can perfectly support
such disturbance with state update rule altered as follows.
Under SI-PPSP, if a node i ∈ V decides to leave at time k,
it should send to pi(i)
di(k) = xi(k)− si,
inform pi−1(i) of stopping sending out contents and altering
update rule at time k as
xpi−1(i)(k + 1) = xpi−1(i)(k) + dpi−1◦pi−1(i)(k),
and then leave. The whole network structure is updated by
G− = (V−,E−), where V− = V \ {i} and E− = E ⋃
{(pi−1(i), pi(i))} \ {(pi−1(i), i), (i, pi(i))}. If an external party
i+ /∈ V is to join, it selects a node i∗ ∈ V and then
directly updates the network by G+ = (V+,E+), where
V+ = V
⋃{i+} and E+ = E⋃{(pi−1(i∗), i+), (i+, pi(i∗))}\
{(pi−1(i∗), pi(i∗))}, and the network G+ can proceed to em-
ploy SI-PPSP.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We provide the following example to illustrate the informa-
tion flow under SI-PPSP.
Example 1. We consider a 3–node ring graph for SI-PPSP.
Then along these two protocols, node states evolution process
is shown in Table I.
Time k x1(k) x2(k) x3(k)
0 s1 s2 s3
1 β1(0) + s3 −
β3(0)
β2(0) + s1 −
β1(0)
β3(0) + s2 −
β2(0)
2 β1(1) +
β3(0) + s2 −
β2(0)− β3(1)
β2(1) +
β1(0) + s3 −
β3(0)− β1(1)
β3(1) +
β2(0) + s1 −
β1(0)− β2(1)
3 β1(2) +
β3(1) +
β2(0) +
s1 − β1(0) −
β2(1)− β3(2)
β2(2) +
β1(1) +
β3(0) +
s2 − β2(0) −
β3(1)− β1(2)
β3(2) +
β2(1) +
β1(0) +
s3 − β3(0) −
β1(1)− β2(2)
...
...
...
...
TABLE I: State evolution under SI-PPSP
The following two examples illustrate the implementation
performance of SI-PPSP and AI-PPSP, under the involvement
of node join and leave.
Example 2. Consider a 10–node ring graph G.
The secrets s1, . . . , s10 held by the nodes are
25.1698, 15.3211, 69.9334, 45.7828, 98.0388, 36.6547,
44.2351, 11.1407, 53.7235, 100, and it turns out
∑
si = 500.
Assume {βi(k)}i∈V,Z≥0 are normally distributed. Set
vi(k) = 1000/(k + 1) for all i = 1, . . . , 10. The experiment
of SI-PPSP is conducted in three phases:
(i) At time k = 0, 1, . . . , 1999, the network executes SI–
PPSP to evaluate the sum
∑
si.
(ii) At time k = 2000, node n chooses to leave and the
network follows the method in Section IV-E to overcome
the disturbance, and then continue to perform behaviors
under SI-PPSP till k = 3999.
(iii) From time k = 4000, node n decides to join back.
We first plot the trajectories of yi(k), i = 1, . . . , 10 in Figure
1. It can be seen that within each phase p = 1, 2, 3 each yi(k)
goes to the correct sum
s˜p =
{
500 if p = 1, 3;
400 if p = 2.
with tolerable error. We then plot the trajectories of
10∑
i=1
|yi(k)− s˜p| for p = 1, 2, 3 in Figure 3. As shown in Figure
3, affected by the disturbance at k = 2000 and k = 4000, node
states are forced to deviate from the correct sum s˜p for a short
period, before going back shortly. The reaction of SI-PPSP
against the disturbance clearly shows its robustness under node
join and leave.
Fig. 2: The trajectories of yi(k)s under SI-PPSP with the involvement
of node join and leave, which occur at k = 2000 and k = 4000,
respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the problem of evaluating the sum of
network secrets. From the dynamic perspective, we proposed
distributed privacy–preserving protocols for computing the
sum, which are robust against disturbance resulted from
node join and leave. Theoretic convergence analysis was
provided, demonstrated with several numerical examples that
also verifies the effectiveness of the proposed protocols. We
also showed that the proposed protocols preserve differential
Fig. 3: The trajectories of
∑ |yi(k)−∑ si| under SI-PPSP with the
involvement of node join and leave, which occur at k = 2000 and
k = 4000, respectively.
privacy and investigated the tradeoff problem among utility,
accuracy and privacy, the solution to which enables us to
provide guidance on appropriate selection of random noise
parameters.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Introduce
x(k) =
x1(k)...
xn(k)
 , y(k) =
y1(k)...
yn(k)
 , β(k) =
β1(k)...
βn(k)
 .
We then rewrite node state dynamics of SI-PPSP compactly
as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + (In −A)β(k), (1)
where A ∈ Rn×n is a circulant matrix in the form
A =

0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . . 0 0
0 0 · · · 1 0
 .
Introduce s = [s1 . . . sn]> and s = 1>n s. Then it is immediate
from (1)
x(k) = Aks +
k−1∑
m=0
Am(In −A)β(k − 1−m). (2)
We next study
E‖y(k)− s1n‖2
= E
∥∥∥∥ n−1∑
r=0
x(k + r)− s1n
∥∥∥∥2
a)
= E
∥∥∥∥Ak( n−1∑
r=0
Ar
)
s− s1n
+
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
Am(In −A)β(l − 1−m)
∥∥∥∥2
b)
=
∥∥∥∥Ak( n−1∑
r=0
Ar
)
s− s1n
∥∥∥∥2
+ E
∥∥∥∥ k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
Am(In −A)β(l − 1−m)
∥∥∥∥2, (3)
where a) follows (2), and b) is obtained by omitting those
terms containing Eβ(k) due to the zero mean assumption on
βi(k)s. We now analyze the first term in (3). According to [8],
A is diagonalizable as A = QΛQ>, where the i–th column
of Q ∈ Rn×n is given by
qi =
1√
n
[
1 wi w
2
i . . . w
n−1
i
]>
,
wi = exp
(
j
2pi(i− 1)
n
)
,
and Λ = diag(wn−11 , . . . , w
n−1
n ) is a diagonal matrix. Then
n−1∑
r=0
Ar = Q
n−1∑
r=0
ΛrQ>
= Q

n−1∑
r=0
w
r(n−1)
1
. . .
n−1∑
r=0
w
r(n−1)
n
Q>. (4)
For i = 2, . . . , n, direct computation shows if n is even
w
r(n−1)
i =
{
w
(n−r)(n−1)
i if r 6= 0;
1 otherwise,
and if n is odd, then it is satisfied
(n−1)/2∑
r=1
Re(w
r(n−1)
i ) =
n−1∑
(n+1)/2
Re(w
r(n−1)
i ) = −
1
2
,
Im(w
r(n−1)
i ) = Im(w
(n−r)(n−1)
i ).
Hence, (4) yields
n−1∑
r=0
Ar = nq1q
>
1 , based on which one has
lim
k=∞
∥∥∥∥Ak( n−1∑
r=0
Ar
)
s− s1n
∥∥∥∥2
= lim
k=∞
∥∥∥∥ [q1 · · · qn]

w
k(n−1)
1
. . .
w
k(n−1)
n

·

nq>1
0
...
0
 s− s1n
∥∥∥∥2
= n2‖q1q>1 ‖2 + s2‖1n‖2 − 2nsq>1 1nq>1 s
= 0. (5)
We next investigate the second term in (3):
lim
k→∞
E
∥∥∥∥ k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
Am(In −A)β(l − 1−m)
∥∥∥∥2
a)
≤ lim
k→∞
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
E
∥∥Am(In −A)β(l − 1−m)∥∥2
b)
≤ lim
k→∞
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
E‖β(l − 1−m)‖2
= lim
k→∞
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
∑
i∈V
v2i (l − 1−m)
≤ n2 max
i∈V
∞∑
k=0
v2i (k)
c)
≤

c2Mpi
2n2
6
if vi(k) =
ci
k + di
;
n2 max
i∈V
c2i
1− φ2i
if vi(k) = ciφki ,
(6)
where a) and b) come from norm inequalities and c) is from
simple calculation of infinite series. Then the proof of the
desired statements is completed by (5), (5) and the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality
∑
i∈V
∣∣∣∣∣∣yi(k)−
∑
j∈V
sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√√√√√∑
i∈V
∣∣∣∣∣∣yi(k)−
∑
j∈V
sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
·
√∑
i∈V
12
=
√
n‖y(k)− s1‖.
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let cijl denote the jl–th entry of C
i, and ril denote the
l–th component of ri. Based on the pairwise independence
assumption, one can directly write
tr(cov(
m∑
i=1
Ciri))
= tr(cov

m∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
ci1lr
i
l
...
m∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
cinlr
i
l
)
=
n∑
j=1
var(
m∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
cijlr
i
l) ≤
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
l=1
(cijl)
2 var(ril)
≤
m∑
i=1
( n∑
j=1
n∑
l=1
(cijl)
2
)
σiM =
m∑
i=1
‖Ci‖2FσiM,
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We will continue to use the notations
y(k),β(k),A,Q,Λ, w1, . . . , wn in the proof of Theorem 1.
Then it follows (2) and the analysis in (5)
Ey(k) = Ak
( n−1∑
r=0
Ar
)
s = s1.
Define σM(k) = max(diag(cov(β(k)))). Again based on (2),
one has using Lemma 1∑
i∈V
var(yi(k)) = tr(cov(y(k)))
= tr(cov(
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
Am(In −A)β(l − 1−m))
≤
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
‖Am(In −A)‖2FσM(l − 1−m)
≤
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
‖A‖2mF ‖In −A‖2FσM(l − 1−m)
= 2n
k+n−1∑
l=k
l−1∑
m=0
σM(l − 1−m). (7)
Let k go to infinity in (7). Then one can easily obtain the
desired result with simple series computation.
APPENDIX D. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We will continue to use the following notations in the Ap-
pendix A: x(k),β(k), s. Additionally, the superscript symbol
prime on a vector v′ is assumed to apply to each of its
components. It is fairly hard to directly study the overall
mappingM. Instead, one can iteratively define a time–varying
mappingMk(x(k)) = d(k) with d(k) = [d1(k) . . . dn(k)]>.
Evidently, there holds
MK = {Mk ◦ · · · ◦M0(s)}k=1,...,K−1
⋃M0(s).
Assuming that each Mk preserves (k, δ, 1)–differential pri-
vacy, according to [9], MK preserves max
{
l∑
k=0
k : l =
0, 1, . . . ,K − 1
}
, namely
K−1∑
k=0
k–differential privacy. The
rest of the proof will clarify the way of calculating k. For
two δ–adjacent secrets x(k),x′(k) ∈ R differing at the i∗–th
component, there holds
Pr(Mk(x(k)) ⊂ R)
Pr(Mk(x′(k)) ⊂ R)
a)
=
fβ(x(k)− d(k))
fβ(x′(k)− d(k))
b)
= exp
( n∑
i=1
|x′i(k)| − |xi(k)|
vi(k)
)
≤ exp
( |x′i∗(k)− xi∗(k)|
vi∗(k)
)
= exp
(
δv−1i∗ (k)
)
, (8)
where a) is by the definition of probability and b) comes from
the fact that β is Laplace distributed. We next discuss (8) in
two cases.
(i) If vi(k) = cik+di , then there holds
vi(k) ≥ cm
k + dM
. (9)
Then it follows (8) and (9)
Pr(Mk(x(k)) ⊂ R)
Pr(Mk(x′(k)) ⊂ R) ≤ exp
(
c−1m δ(k + dM )
)
. (10)
From (10), one has k = c−1m δ(k + dM ), which leads to
 =
K−1∑
k=0
k = c
−1
m δK(
K − 1
2
+ dM ),
which completes the proof of (i).
(ii) If vi(k) = ciφki , it is analogous vi(k) ≥ cmφkm. Then
k = c
−1
m δφ
−k
m
and
 =
K−1∑
k=0
k =
c−1m δ(1− φKm)
φK−1m − φKm
.
This completes the proof of (ii).
APPENDIX E. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
(i) Suppose vi(k) = cik+di . According to Theorem 1, 2 and 3,
one can summarize the tradeoff among utility, accuracy and
privacy as the following optimization problem:
min
cM ,cm>0,dM≥0
γucMpin
√
n
6
+ γa
c2Mpi
2n2
3
+ γp
(
c−1m δK
(
K − 1
2
+ dM
)
s.t. cM ≥ cm.
(11)
Since the term of dM in the objective of (11) is linear and
its coefficient γpc−1m δK is strictly positive, the optimal dM
should be zero independently. Then the optimization problem
(11) can be compactly written as U(θ)
min
θ∈Θ
U(θ)
s.t. p>θ ≤ 0
(12)
where
p =
[−1 1]> ,
Θ =
{ [
θ1 θ2
]> ∈ R2 : θ1, θ2 > 0},
U(θ) = γuθ1pin
√
n
6
+ γa
θ21pi
2n2
3
+ γpθ
−1
2 δK
(
K − 1
2
)
.
Note that the variables θ1 and θ2 in (12) represents cM and
cm, respectively. It can be easily shown that (12) is a convex
optimization problem because Θ is a convex set, and the
objective U and the constraint are both convex functions of θ.
Since the constraint p>θ is an affine function, weak Slater’s
condition and thus strong duality holds for (12) according to
Section 5.2.3 in [10]. Therefore, θ∗ ∈ R2 is optimal for (12)
if and only if the following Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions
hold:
∇U(θ∗) = −µp, (13)
µp>θ = 0 (14)
for some µ ≥ 0. Direct computation shows
∇U(θ) =
[
2γapi
2n2
3 θ1 + γupin
√
n
6
−γpδK(K−1)
2θ22
]
. (15)
Next we study the equation set (13)–(15). It is evident from
(15) ∇U(θ∗) 6= 0, and thus by (13) µ 6= 0. As a result of
(14), there must hold
θ1 = θ2. (16)
In addition, by (13) and (15), one has
2γapi
2n2
3
θ1 + γupin
√
n
6
=
γpδK(K − 1)
2θ22
. (17)
The equation set (16)–(17) finally leads to a cubic function
with respect to θ:
g(θ) = 4γapi
2n2θ3+
√
6γupin
3
2 θ2−3γpδK(K−1) = 0. (18)
Since g(0) < 0 and there exists θˆ > 0 such that g(θ) ≥ g(θˆ) ≥
0 for all θ ≥ θˆ, it can be concluded that there at least exists
one 0 < θ∗ < θˆ such that g(θ∗) = 0, i.e., θ∗ is a positive
real root of (18). Next we show such θ∗ is unique. One can
directly compute
g′(θ) = 12γapi2n2θ2 + 2
√
6γupin
3
2 θ.
It can be seen that g′(θ) > 0 for all θ > 0, implying that g(θ)
is strictly increasing over (0,∞). This results in the uniqueness
of θ∗ and completes the proof of (i).
(ii) We now consider the vi(k) = ciφki case and continue to use
the notations cM , cm, φM , φm to represent the maximum or
minimum of all cis and φis. To simplify the tradeoff analysis,
we slightly loosen the results of Theorem 1 and 2 to
lim
k→∞
E
∑
i∈V
∣∣∣∣∣∣yi(k)−
∑
j∈V
sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ cMn
√
n
1− φ2M
, (19)
lim
k→∞
∑
i∈V
var(yi(k)) ≤ 2n
2c2M
1− φ2M
. (20)
Based on (19), (20) and Theorem 3, one can express the
tradeoff problem as
min
cM ,cm>0,0<φm,φM<1
γucMn
√
n
1− φ2M
+ γa
2n2c2M
1− φ2M
+ γu
c−1m δ(1− φKm)
φK−1m − φKm
s.t. cM ≥ cm.
(21)
